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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

UTA..~

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
MICHAEL GEORGE DURRANT,

Case No. 18051

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, MICHAEL GEORGE DURANT, appeals from the
conviction and judgment of Aggravated Arson, a felony in the
Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, MICHAEL GEORGE DURANT, was tried and
convicted of Aggravated Arson, a Second Degree felony.

Appellant

was sentence to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years
pursuant to §76-3-402 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
wherein the judge lowered the penalty to the next lower category
and imposed sentence accordingly.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by
the Court below and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 1, 1980, at approximately 1:50 a.m. the
house where the appellant and the owner resided was set on fire.
The fire was allegedly caused by a liquid-pour accellerant
(T. 5, L.16-18).

Bullet holes were found in the kitchen walls.

Bullet casings and fragments were also found (T. 7, L.21-25);
8, L.1-6).

Appellant gave the police a statement later that

morning, and also another one on June 5, 1981.

In the first

statement, appellant said he and Rose (the owner) had been out
drinking earlier that evening of November 30, and that Rose's
car broke down.

They came home, then left to return to the car,

then spent the entire evening with a friend in West Valley (T. 27,
L.20-25; 28, L.1-2).
Miss Martin, the witness who lived next door, said that
she saw appellant and Rose together in the house the night of
November 30 when the shots were fired (T. 18, L.1-7).

Then Rose

left a few minutes before the fire started (T. 18, L.10-11; 24,
L.2-5).

After the fire started, Miss Martin said she saw

appellant leaving the scene (T. 18, L.15-25).

She said both

appellant and Rose returned the next morning asking what had
happened (T. 21, L.23-24).
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After appellant was arrested on June 5, 1981, he gave a
statement (STate's Exhibit 8-P), which differed from his prior
one (T. 28, L.6-8).

In that statement, appellant admitted that

he started the fire but was acting under the directions of Rose,
the owner.
Counsel made a motion to dismiss at the end of the State's
case.

The motion was based on the argument that defendant did not

act "unlawfully" nor commit aggravated arson in setting the fire,
using Christendon (infra) as authority.

The motion was denied.

Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated Arson as charged.
That crime normally carries a penalty of one to fifteen years,
but at sentencing, Judge Leary decided to reduce the penalty in
appellant's case to zero to five years.

§76-3-402 Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended), reads:
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of
offense.--(1) If the court, having regard
to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found
guilty and to the history and character of
the defendant, concludes that it would be
unduly harsh to record the conviction as
being for that category of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to
that offense, the court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower
category of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
In his judgment, Judge Leary recorded the conviction as
"Aggravated Arson, a Third Degree felony," meaning he decided the
charge was appropriate, but that the normal penalty would be
unduly harsh.

He sentenced appellant according to the next lower
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category resulting in appellant's zero to five years sentence.
This sentencing procedure does not affect the substance
of appellant's argument wherein it is contended that he should
not have been found guilty of Aggravated Arson initially.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF THE
CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ARSON SINCE HE DID NOT
"UNLAWFULLY" BURN A HATITABLE STRUCTURE.
The following statutes are relevant to a determination of
the appellant's criminal culpability in this case:
76-6-104. Reckless burning.--(1) A person
is guilty of reckless burning if he:
(a) Recklessly starts a fire or causes
an explosion which endangers human life; or
(b) Having started a fire, whether
recklessly or not, and knowing that it is spreading and will endanger the life or property of
another, either fails to take reasonable measures
to put out or control the fire or fails to give
a prompt fire alarm; or
(c) Damages the property of another by
reckless use of fire or causing an explosion.
76-6-102. Arson.--(1) A person is guilty of
arson, if under circumstances not amounting
to aggravated arson, by means of fire or
explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally
damages:
(a) Any property with intention of
defrauding an insurer; or
(b)

The property of another.

76-6-102. Aggravated arson.--[(l)] A person
is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a)

A habitable structure; or

(b) Any structure or vehLcle when any
person not a participant in the offense is
in the structure or vehicle.
(Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended)
Appellant asserts that while his conduct may be proscribed
by the provisions of §76-6-104 and §76-6-102, it does not fall
within the provisions of §76-6-103, and he is therefore not guilty
of aggravated arson.
A traditional principle of law is that it is not "unlawful"
for an owner to destroy his own property by burning it.
ALR 1168.

See

17

At common law, an owner had autonomy over his own

property and could dispose of it, or destroy it, as he so desired.
This principle remains in tact, except insofar as the legislature
has modified it.

The legislature has created three distinct

offenses which proscribe the act of burning and destroying property.
One of these offenses, "reckless burning," conspicuoulsy
omits the word "unlawful," and seeks to punish even those who
choose :to destroy their own property.

The "reckless burning"

statute is offended if one recklessly starts a fire which endangers
human life, or endangers or damages the property of another.

The

obvious intent of the legislature is to protect the person and
property of others that may be nearby the fire, regardless of any
justification that may exist for the burning itself.
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Thus, even though an individual burns down his own property
in an exercise of autonomy, he is guilty of reckless burning
if there is a danger of the fire spreading to adjoining property
or harming people nearby.

Appellant's conduct, even though

he was acting at the direction of the owner of the property,
and thus burning "his own" property, is clearly sanctioned
by the "reckless burning" statute.
The "arson" statute, on the other hand, clearly incorporates
the common law notion by using the word "unlawful".

The legislature

has specifically defined the unlawful conduct; a person may
not burn any property with the intent of defrauding an insurer,
nor may an individual burn the property of another, under circumstances
not amounting to aggravated arson.

In this case, Rose could

be found guilty of arson if it is shown that his intent in
procuring appellant to burn the property was to defraud an
insurer.

(References to that effect are found in Plaintiff's

Exhibit 8-P)

Appellant, of course, would also commit the fraud

if he knew the owner's intent.

He could not, however, be convicted

under subsection (b) (destroying the property of another) where
he had permission from the owner.
The "aggravated arson" statute also incorporates the
word "unlawful" in its language.

Aggravated arson is "arson"

plus two specifically defined aggravations.

Under subsection

(a) if an individual commits "arson" (burns any property to
defraud an insurer, or burns the property of another), and
that property is habitable, the offense becomes aggravated.
The Sponsored
commonby the
law
notion that an individual may destroy his own
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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endanger

victims, remains intact.

Under subsection (b), however, the

legislature creates an aggravation that occurs when any property
is damaged.

The common law notion is thus modified where a

victim is inside the structure.
The policy behind the aggravated arson statute is not
abrogated by incorporating the interpretation of "unlawful"
into its provisions as that word is illuminated by the arson
statute.

Under subsection (a), the aggravated arson statute

addresses itself to other people's habitable structures, like
hotels, warehouses, offices, and homes.
On the other hand, under subsection (b) a person can
be guilty of the offense if he or she damages by fire or explosives
any structure or vehicle when a person is inside.

Thus, where

an individual may be harmed within the structure, ownership
of the structure is irrelevant.

The statute is obviously worded

and sensibly interpreted to apply to another's property under
subsection (a) and any property under subsection (b).
Appellant, therefore, cannot be guilty of aggravated
arson.

The circumstances surrounding the incident indicate

complicity between appellant, the actor, and Rose, the owner.
Appellant was procured by Rose, the owner, to burn the house.
The relationship is one of agent/principal or principal and
accomplice.

The focus must necessarily shift to the owner

because the agent cannot be any more responsible than the principal,
where the agent is merely following the principal's directives.
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A case directly on point and supportive of appellant's
position is State v. Christendon, 468 P.2d 153 (Kansas 1970).
In that case, the defendant applied the torch to the owner's
property (a hotel) at the owner's request.
the defendant to do the deed.

The owner had procured

There, the owner was found guilty

of "insurance arson" a third degree felony, but could not be
found guilty of first degree arson of the building.

The court

said a necessary element of first degree arson (comparable
to Utah's 76-6-103) is that "the building burned be the property
of another person", id at 155.

The cases dealing with the

owner's culpability were State v. Parrish, 468 P.2d 143 (Kansas
1970), and State v. Parrish, 468 P.2d 150 (Kansas 1970).
In Christendon, the defendant could not be found guilty
of first degree arson and his conviction on that charge was
reversed.

The court explained that the defendant "could not

be guilty of a more serious crime than the owner who hired
him," 468 P.2d at 154.

The Parrish cases established that

the owner intended to defraud or injure an insurer.
showed that the defendant expected renumeration

The evidence

for his deed.

The Christendon court referred to the annotation in
54 A.L.R. p. 1236 which commented on State v. Craig, 259 P.2d
802 (Kansas 1927).

The court said that:

. . . in a number of other cases, the courts have
discussed the criminal liability of one who burns
a building with the sanction of the owner at the
times of the burning, and have held that such a
person is not guilty of arson, since, at common
law and under most statutes, one cannot be criminally
liable for burning his own building, and an agent
cannot be more liable than his principal would
be if he did the act.
[citing cases]
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As to the culpability of the agent, the court referred
to 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arson and Related Offenses, §23, p. 818:
If the owner in possession is not guilty of arson
in burning his own property, then one who assists
the owner in burning it or who burns it at the
owner's request is not guilty of arson, for the
agent's guilt can only be coextensive with that
of the principal.
In holding the agent's guilt to be coextensive with
the owner's, the Ohio Supreme Court in Haas v. State, 132 N.E.
158 (1921) said:
It is but the application of ordinary logic to
say that if the aider and abettor is guilty of
the same crime as the principal, and may be prosecuted
as a principal, that the principal is guilty of
the same crime as the aider and abettor; that in
law the action of the one is treated as the action
of both, and that the actions of both are no different
than though the separate acts of each were performed
by one person. * * *
(132 N.E. at 159)
The Christendo.n Court summed up its position by stating
that under statutes similar to its first degree arson statute,
the cases were quite uniform in holding that an agent who burns
the owner's building at the request of the owner cannot be
held guilty of burning the property of another.
cases:

It cited these

[Haas v. State, supra; Commonwealth v. Makely, 131

Mass. 421 (1881); State v. Haynes, 66 Me. 307 (1876); Roberts
v. The Sate, 7 Cold. (42 Tenn) 359 (1870); Heard v. State,
81 Ala. 55, 1 So. 640 (1887); Dedieu v. The People, 22 N.Y.
[Appeals] 178 (1860); State v. Sarvis, 45 S.C. 668, 24 S.E.
53 (1896); State v. Greer, 243 Mo. 599, 147 S.W. 968 (1912).
See also Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure [Anderson] Vol.
II, Arson §405, p.20

The court went on to say that:
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Although the relationship of principal and agent
is not technically applicable to criminal law,
yet responsibility for burning property generally
depends upon the intent or mens rea of the owner
who procures the burning. If the owner desires
to rid himself of a building by burning and can
limit the fire to his own building he may do so.
Without a willful or malicious intent he commits
no crime. An owner can hire someone to do to his
property what he himself may do. The person hired
to burn the property of the owner commits no greater
crime than the owner.
The reasoning which limits the guilt of the agent
arises out of the law of principals and accessories.
The person who applies the torch to the property
is the principal. The person who procures, counsels
and aids the principal to burn the property is
the accessory. In theory the accessory (owner)
is regarded as constructively present, giving aid,
counsel and encouragement to successfully accomplish
the common purpose. The separate acts of the accessory
(the owner) and of the principal (the torch) unite
in one purpose. (See Perkins on Criminal Law [University
Textbook Series], Parties to Crime, p. 572). The
purpose in this case, which makes the burning criminal
in nature is the owner's intent to defraud the
insurer by burning the property. If the defendant
knew he was assisting the owner in defrauding the
insurer when he set fire to the owner's property
he too was guilty of accomplishing the crime proscribed
by Kansas' Third Degree Arson Statute. Bur in
any event the purpose accomplished by both accessory
and principal remains the same. The purpose was
not to burn the property of another person.
Thus, the reasoning of the controlling authorities support
appellant's position that his actions as "the torch" can be
no more culpable than those of Rose, the owner.

Here, the

evidence shows that appellant acted at the request of and under
the direction of Rose.
The neighbor testified that Rose and appellant were
both in the house when the shots were fired at about 12:30
a.m. on December 1.

(T. 18, L.1-8).

The neighbor also said
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Rose left the house just before it was set ablaze (T. 18, L.1011).

If the fire started at 1:50 a.m. as testified to, then

Rose remained inside for more than one hour after the shots.
Soon after Rose left, the fire started and appellant was seen
leaving the area (T. 18, L.15-25).

Later that morning, both

Rose and appellant returned to the scene.
In his June 5 statement, appellant said that Rose would
pay him $1,000 if he would participate in setting the house
on fire.

In preparing to set the fire, appellant said Rose

first secured his personal papers, titles etc., and his gun,
and then told appellant where (what area of the house) to dump
the laquer thinner.

After this was done, Rose left in the car

and appellant immediately started the fire as per Rose's instructions.
He then ran out to meet Rose who was waiting for him in fro.nt
of a shack a short distance away from the burning house. Then
they both "took off" in the car.

Appellant explained "how

Rose set up their alibi with Fred Butler in West Valley."

He

also stated that he was never paid for helping Rose burn his
house down.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction of aggravated arson cannot stand.
His culpability can be no greater than that of the owner, Rose.
Under the aggravated arson statute, a defendant cannot be guilty
of destroying his own property unless an innocent person was
inside the structure.

Since no victims were involved, and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

the burning was not of the habitable structure of another,
appellant's conviction must be reversed.
DATED this

..--z__

day of September, 1982.
."-
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l~~ / k--c_j(\ (7~

NANCY BE~
Attorney for App llant

\
_)

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

~~day

of September, 1982.
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